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Plural Agents, Private Intentions, and
Legal Interpretation

SCOTT SOAMES*

The chief problem posed in Multimember Legislative Bodies and
Intended Meaning is one in which lawmakers pass a tax bill supported by
two equal groups with conflicting interpretations of the bill’s content.
One believes it taxes imported tomatoes, among other things; the other
believes it exempts tomatoes. They disagree because they received supposedly
authoritative, but in fact conflicting, information about the meaning of
“fruit” in the bill’s text. One group was told it is used with its biological
sense, which includes tomatoes as edible seed-bearing reproductive
parts of a plant. The other group was told that “fruit” is used with its culinary
sense, in which fruits are contrasted with vegetables, including tomatoes.
The bill is understood as taxing imported fruits but not vegetables. Our
problem is to decide how the tax applies to a shipment of tomatoes and kiwis.
My answer will follow from the answer to the question What did the
lawmakers assert or stipulate in passing the bill?—which can be
illuminated by answering an analogous question about what action two
employers instruct an employee to take.
PROBLEM 1: CONTENTS OF MULTI-PERSON SPEECH ACTS
Imagine that Mary receives written instructions, signed by her employers,
Smith and Jones, each instructing her “to ship textiles to a buyer in Athens on
the Peerless, and only the Peerless.” Preparing to do so, she learns that two
ships by that name are bound for Athens, one from Plymouth and one
*
© 2021 Scott Soames. Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, University of
Southern California.

151

V.23_SOAMES.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

11/9/2021 1:52 PM

from Southampton. Having no way of contacting her employers, she has
no way of knowing whether both were referring to the Plymouth ship,
both were referring to the Southampton ship, or whether one was referring
to the former and the other was referring to the latter. In fact, they were
referring to different ships.
Because it is understood that all instructions must be jointly issued to
be acted upon, it would seem that Mary wasn’t instructed to send the
shipment by either ship. Was she, nevertheless instructed to ship it
to Athens? Yes, her employers did each instructed her to do that. If doing
B (shipping goods to Athens) is an obvious consequence of doing A
(shipping them to Athens on a specific vessel), and one has been
instructed to do A, then one is also instructed to do B. So, Smith and
Jones each instructed her to send a shipment to Athens. Even so, Mary
has no basis for acting. The fact that one has been instructed to do B—
ship goods to Athens—doesn’t entail that one has been instructed to
do B any way one can. Since Mary was not so instructed, so she has no
authority to act.
This would be the end of the story if the content of her instructions was
determined only by the factors so far mentioned. Now we add a new
factor—namely, that Smith and Jones are aware of office procedure
specifying that Mary is to ship orders to other countries only in vessels
listed in the current published volume of ships licensed to engage in trade
with them. Although Smith and Jones each believe that his is the only
listed “Peerless,” only Jones is right. Having been misled about how long
his “Peerless” has operated, Smith didn’t realize that it entered service
after publication of this year’s volume. Might this play a role in determining
what Mary was jointly instructed to do? Yes, it might, if, by common
convention, it is understood that an employee of the company is to perform
the action best supported by all available evidence, which, in this case,
is to ship the goods by the Southampton “Peerless.” Although Smith
did intend shipment on another vessel, he also intended the goods to be
shipped on the only “Peerless” listed in the authoritative volume, as did
Jones. Because Smith and Jones shared that intention (despite their
differing intentions of which ship it determined) Mary had the authority
to act.
But we still haven’t gone far enough. Her employers need not know the
details of how their employees work. It’s enough that they realize that Mary
knows how to interpret their memos in accord with longstanding rules. In
this final version of our scenario we imagine that Smith is new to the
company and simply knows his instructions go with those of Jones to
Mary, who puts them into effect. Except for this twist everything is as
before. As before, her joint instructions, augmented by the shipping manual,
authorizes her to send the shipment on the Southampton Peerless, even
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though Smith lacked that intention. What her employers did jointly intend
was for their attentive, reasonable, and informed employee, following
company procedures, to do what their written instructions gave her most
reason to think she was directed to do. Since she had reason to think that
they intended her to follow long established policies, she did, in fact, do
what she was jointly instructed to do..
Next we look at general communicative principles that underlie this
result, starting with those generating the illocutionary forces of ordinary
uses of language by individuals. Some uses of language occur in private
thought—to prove propositions, imagine scenarios and plan actions.
Other uses are social. If you promise Y to do X, you give Y a claim on
you. Ditto for assertion. To assert P is, roughly, to give one’s guarantee
that P is true. These speech acts are governed by social rules because their
function is to provide others with reasons for thinking, feeling, and acting.
Because their thoughts, feelings, and actions may be consequential, the
contents hearers justifiably assign to one’s remarks are those for which
one is responsible. They are propositions asserted, guaranteed to be true,
or promised to be made true.
When you use a (declarative) sentence S you typically have two
intentions. One is to assert your privately cognized proposition P, vouching
for its truth. The other is to assert the proposition Q that is justifiably
derivable from your use of S, thereby vouching for it. To ensure
communication, you choose S so that P and Q will coincide. Often they
do, but sometimes they don’t. When they don’t, it is, as you well know,
Q, not P, that you will be held responsible for asserting. The same is true
with ordering or instructing, which, for simplicity, we may take to be
instructions or orders to make an intended proposition true.
Now consider a plural use of a jointly signed memo from Smith and
Jones to Mary using the sentence S: “We jointly instruct you to ship the
textiles to a buyer in Athens by the Peerless and only the Peerless.”
Smith’s private intention is Ps: We instruct you to make it true that the
textiles are shipped to Athens on the Peerlesss and only on it. Jones’s
private intention is Pj: We instruct you to make it true that the textiles are
shipped to Athens on the Peerlessj and only on it. Each endorses the
sentence because each takes his P proposition to be the one that Mary will
justifiably derive from their joint use of the sentence, following customary
office procedures. So, although they have different actions in mind, they
share the communicative intention that Mary is to perform the action
determined by their verbal instruction, interpreted using customary office
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procedures. Knowing that this is how they will be interpreted, they
understand that what, if anything, they have jointly instructed is the
performance of that action.
PROBLEM 2: INVERTED NIX V. HEDDEN ON STEROIDS
Problem 2 turns on whether tomatoes count as vegetables and so are
exempt from a tariff on imported fruits. The law stipulates that a tax
is to be applied to imported fruits but not vegetables. It further stipulates
“There shall be no discrimination among types of fruit in levying this tax.”
The question is how, if at all, tomatoes and kiwis are to be taxed.
The problem arises from the multiple meanings of “fruit” and the
relations they bear to the meaning of “vegetable.” The relevant linguistic
facts are these.
F1. “Fruit” has a biological meaning in which it applies (more or
less) to “seed-bearing reproductive parts of plants”–including
tomatoes, peas, beans, eggplants, cucumbers, squash, and peppers,
as well as cherries, kiwis, grapes, oranges, and so on.
F2. “Vegetable” is a culinary, not a biological, term that contrasts
with the second, culinary, meaning of “fruit.” It applies to tomatoes
potatoes, parsnips, cucumbers, beans, eggplants, squash, turnips,
beets, cauliflower, cabbage, celery, etc.
F3. The culinary meaning of “fruit” applies to some, but not all, items
to which its biological meaning applies. Those include grapes, apples
oranges, pears, kiwis, peaches, watermelons, strawberries, and the
like, while excluding all vegetables.
To resolve the case, we must decide which meaning “fruit” univocally
bears in the bill’s text. If it is the biological meaning, then, by F1,
tomatoes are fruits, while, by F2, they are also vegetables. Since the law
explicitly states that vegetables are not taxed, it would follow that at least
one kind of fruit is not to be taxed. But then by the no discrimination among
kinds of fruit provision, it follows that no fruits are taxed, whether vegetables
or not. On this interpretation the law is vacuous, or incoherent, or both.
Since no one reading the text would be in a position to presume that, it
can’t be right.
So, we must take “fruit” to bear its second, more restricted, meaning
in the statute. If so, the kiwis will be taxed, but not the tomatoes. But
how can this be so, when only 1/3 of the lawmakers both understood it
this way and supported it, while 2/3 of them would have voted against it,
had they shared that understanding? The answer is that legal content isn’t
an aggregate of specific private intentions of the lawmakers. The content
of an adopted legal text is what is asserted or stipulated by its supporters.
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For a content to be asserted or stipulated, it isn’t necessary that it conform
with the specific private intentions of half the lawmakers. The illocutionary
content of collective speech, is not, in general, an aggregate of the specific
private illocutionary intentions of collective speakers.
What lawmakers assert in adopting a text is determined by what a
reasonable, informed audience that understands the text’s linguistic
meaning (including special legal meanings if any), the relevant publicly
available facts and aspects of the lawmaking history, and the area of
existing law into which the new law is expected to fit would rationally
take the lawmakers to intend to assert or stipulate. Often legislative acts
have multiple audiences, including law enforcement officials, judges,
lawyers, and businessmen, as well as the general public. Thus, the content of
a law will sometimes include matters of detail to which only some
specialized audiences are sensitive, along with other broader matters. It
isn’t necessary that the various institutional addressees, or the populace,
possess detailed knowledge of the contents of all laws relevant to them,
though it is necessary that they have recourse to legal experts who can
advise them. It is also not required that all, or sometimes any, members
of a legislative body have complete knowledge of all aspects of the
assertive content of the sometimes complicated bills they have adopted on
the basis of their individually partial, but collectively overlapping,
understanding. It is required that the assertive content be rationally derivable.
In our tax case this isn’t difficult. The derivation requires knowledge
of the meaning of “vegetable” and the two meanings of “fruit”—one,
broader and more capable of being precisely stated, the other, narrower
but more familiar. Asked to explain either one, we can hardly do better
than list paradigmatic instances, as in F2 and F3. This, plus the
presumption that the statute isn’t an obvious nullity is all we need. The
justification of this presumption is on par with presumptions governing
ordinary uses of language by agents to guide the behavior of others.
When a putatively rational agent uses language to direct an audience to
do something, it is presumed that the audience has been supplied with
the information needed to identify the action. When the situation admits
of only one interpretation satisfying that presumption, the agent is counted as
having directed that the action be performed. Usually, an individual agent
has a private, specific intention involving the action that satisfies the
presumption. But sometimes, when one misspeaks or is confused, this
intention fails to do so, leaving only the agent’s general intention to direct
the act be taken for which one has provided sufficient evidence. These
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are cases in which the actual illocutionary content of one’s use of a text
differs from one’s private, most specific, intended illocutionary content.
The plural agent in our inverted Nix v. Hedden case is in a similar
situation. To say that a plural agent asserts, stipulates, or promises something
is to treat the plurality as a rational agent using language to communicate
with others. Imagine a total of 9 lawmakers voting on the text of a bill with
which each privately associates an interpretive proposition P. When the
text gets 5 or more votes, it is associated with 5 or more intentions to
guarantee the truth of whatever proposition Q is justifiably derivable from
public facts about the meaning of the text, the context of the text’s
adoption, the legislative history, and the body of law into which the bill is
expected to fit. Q thereby becomes law, even if it differs from some or
all of the private Ps associated with the text by its 5 or more
supporters—some or all of whom were either ignorant of, or indifferent
to, the distinction between the public Q and their private P’s. This is what
it means for collective assertive intentions not to be aggregates of private
assertive intentions.
Although our inverted Nix v Hedden fits this picture, it is unusual
because 6 of the 9 private P’s would, if collectively recognized, have
defeated the bill. In this way the final result was an unfortunate instance
of collective misspeaking. But that doesn’t undermine the method. The
needed interpretive assignment of content to statutory and constitutional
texts must be generally applicable in a way that divining private legislative
intentions isn’t. If you don’t recognize this, but instead limit your
interpretations to those extractable from public linguistic meanings plus
public records of private intentions, you are bound to miss, and frequently
underestimate, the substantive original assertive content of complex,
contentious law—often to the detriment of a proper understanding of
legal milestones, like the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.
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